Florida First #3: Floridian Academia's China Problem
How Chinese influence has subverted the University of Florida (UF), alongside other State University System schools, for the gains of China.
[Note: Google Translate has been used for materials in this article originally in Chinese. Therefore, text included in quotations may not reflect the original phrasing of a message, although sufficient work has been dedicated to preserving the meaning of the original message in each case.]
The University of Florida has become the jewel of the State University System of Florida in recent years, ranking 30th in the nation for education and research, according to U.S. News & World Report.1 This high level of prestige and research activity makes it a ripe target for foreign actors, especially those interested in stealing American research. Other Florida universities have also found themselves in foreign crosshairs, including the University of Central Florida and Florida State University.
Florida has already taken active measures to reduce foreign influence and assistance from schools within Florida’s State University System (SUS). Under Florida Board of Governors Regulation 9.012, in alignment with Florida Statute 288.860,2 any existing contract or research agreement with a “foreign country of concern” (the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, Maduro’s Venezuela, or the Syrian Arab Republic)3 must be presented to the Florida Board of Governors for review.4 This review process determines whether the agreement is beneficial to the American public or research university, and if it is, whether it makes the US vulnerable in terms of national security. This regulation also made this review process necessary for any future agreement to be reached between SUS schools and actors from foreign countries of concern. This broad measure drastically reduced the amount of foreign agreements from 141 in November 2024, down to 4 in June 2025, according to a report put out by SUS.5
So, with all these regulations in place, one may wonder what the Achille’s heel of Florida’s SUS is. Upon further inspection, Florida is overlooking a critical attack surface that Chinese state intelligence regularly exploits: student organizations.
Chinese Students and Scholars Associations
Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) are organizations masquerading as student-led groups, claiming to only promote Chinese cultural exchange and provide services to Chinese international students on campus, while they obscure their true nature. In reality, according to the US State Department, most CSSAs operate at the behest of the United Front Work Department (UFWD), a department that reports directly to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.6 The UFWD seeks to grow the United Front, a collection of businesses, organizations, networks and individuals that act to further the goals of China, both at home and overseas.7 CSSAs are controlled by the UFWD via close contact with Chinese Embassy and Consulate officials, who disseminate instructions to them in order to unite Chinese nationals around party goals. These goals include the suppression of narratives and discussions that counter the goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), such as the suppression of Uyghur8 rights protests, and promoting pro-CCP ideas like the One China idea.9
They have also been noted for performing espionage operations, like in Leuven, where their CSSA was noted for participating in Industrial Espionage.10
This, in practice, means that universities are inadvertently subjected to CCP influence, which opens campuses to a wide variety of threats to both intellectual freedom and intellectual property. With CSSAs’ locus of control in mind, it is easy to see why these groups should be registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), an act that requires the registration of organizations operating under a foreign principal. Such concerns have been reflected by leaders such as Senator Tim Scott in his letter to the Department of Justice, which seems to have fallen on deaf ears.11 The reason for this escapes both us and Senator Scott.
Florida’s CSSA Problem
CSSAs aren’t just phantoms for other states, as they operate here in our home as well. According to cssa.us, a website indexing all CSSAs operating in the US for use by Chinese students, there are four CSSAs operating in Florida, three of which are at SUS schools.12
The schools in which these CSSAs are operating are: Florida State University, the University of Central Florida, the University of Florida and the University of Miami.
As the University of Miami is outside the scope of this article (it is not a SUS school), we will not be covering it. Its CSSA also does not maintain any active webpage, and any archive available of its old website is unusable, so no thorough investigation could be conducted. The University of Florida’s CSSA seems to have disbanded, as it is not listed on any current student directory. We will be discussing it anyway, as it formerly operated on their campus.
So, let’s start with Florida State University.
The Tallahassee Plot Unravels
The CSSA at Florida State University (FSU) purports to be the typical Chinese student organization, providing resources to members and promoting “social, intellectual, and cultural activities for Chinese students and scholars at Florida State University, with a mission to promote cultural interaction and friendship for all, as well as provide services for its registered members.”13
This, however, is far from the case. This CSSA attempts to conceal its ties to the Chinese Consulate in Houston, although it fails in that regard. This CSSA previously maintained a Google mailing group that was abandoned sometime around late 2020.14 Using this information source, we analyzed it for pertinent information. Upon examination of this mailing group, three facts become readily apparent:
Chinese Consular Officials maintain active contact with the CSSA.
The Chinese Consulate funds this CSSA in part.
The Chinese Consulate issues directives to this CSSA and meets with CSSA leaders.
Fact 1 can be easily deduced from an email sent on October 31st, 2011. Within this email, titled “Regarding Overseas Talent Recruitment for the School of Business at East China University of Science and Technology (ECUST),” the wife of a Houston Consulate official informs students of a job opportunity at ECUST, referencing past attempts by consular officials to share this job opportunity, and encourages students to reach out if they are interested.15 This email reflects the intertwined nature of the CSSA and the Consulate, with the reader of the email assumed to be familiar with “Consul Zhou Haibo,” a CCP official. This assertion is also supported by a Chinese-language news article, where Haibo attended an event alongside representatives of CSSAs.16 This interconnectedness between the Consulate and the CSSA suggests that the CCP has ties to this CSSA, and may be influencing its actions (we’ll reinforce this theory with Fact 3).
Fact 2 can likewise be easily deduced. On April 7th, 2009, an email was sent as a sort of CSSA community update, stating that one of the ways the “student union” (CSSA) gets funding is via “Consulate sponsorship.”17 This sponsorship was said to account for part of the CSSA’s funding, the rest coming from fundraising. This financial dependence opens up the CSSA to manipulation, as the email says that the CSSA was struggling financially, barely making ends meet. This vital cash flow can be used to coerce CSSA leaders to organize their members into actions at the behest of the CCP, effectively making it an extension of the CCP on a publicly funded American campus.
Fact 3 reinforces this claim more effectively. On April 9th, 2011, the CSSA sent an email of the record of events of the previous election meeting, which occurred on the same day, where they include a crucial line: “Jiang Yun conveyed the results of last month’s work report to all CSSA members, as well as the requirements of the Ambassador and Consul of the Chinese Embassy [sic] in Houston for the next year’s work.”18 In this statement, it is revealed outright that the Chinese Consulate in Houston gives direct orders to the CSSA regarding what actions the organization is to perform.
This effectively and undeniably proves the FSU CSSA an organ of the CCP, and works to further the goals of the CCP. This undeniably classifies this CSSA as part of the United Front effort, posing it as a direct threat against our national security.
For the next two schools, we by no means have as much novel evidence as we do for FSU, but a logical mind can deduce the implications of control well enough.
The Space Coast’s Knights Faced a Dragon
The University of Central Florida had a CSSA chapter as well. Its abandoned Facebook group is restricted to members only, its old WeChat group (a popular Chinese messaging service) isn’t publicly advertised and their websites are down. We were, however, able to salvage archives of its main website. From an archive of their sites overview page from October 31st of 2017, they openly state, “we thank our Chinese Embassy for her consistent support to our mutual efforts.”19 Any relationship of support between a domestic institution and a foreign embassy, especially one of a hostile state actor, raises concerns.
Their CSSA seems to have dissolved sometime after 2023, as that’s the last time it updated their Instagram page. But, we can conclusively conclude that this CSSA was actively affiliated with and supported by the Chinese Embassy. This mirrors other the activity of other CSSAs that are known United Front actors.20
The Gators Snap Back
The University of Florida (UF) has not been immune from this plague of foreign influence either. A CSSA operates at UF as well, with an active entry in UF’s student organization directory.21 This CSSA, according to a news report from 2024, maintains an active connection to the Chinese Embassy, being described as “officially approved.”22 Inquisitive readers who visited the link in footnote 21 know where this piece is going, as this is not the only thing that article reveals.
This article also reveals that the president of the CSSA in 2024, Nongnong "Leticia" Zheng, was being investigated by a Federal grand jury over her involvement in a “multi-million dollar scheme to divert biomedical samples of dangerous drugs and toxins from a campus laboratory to China.”23 According to federal court records described by WUFT, the dangerous drugs exported included fentanyl, morphine, MDMA, cocaine, ketamine, codeine, methamphetamine, amphetamine, acetylmorphine and methadone; these were sent back in trace amounts to China in order for the calibration of research equipment, most likely. The toxins were non-contagious protein extracts of the cholera toxin and pertussis toxin. The prosecution alleges that the export of these goods violated US law.
Ms. Zheng is presumed innocent unless proven guilty, and the allegations remain unproven unless resolved in court or dropped. It is rather coincidental that the president of a CSSA just so happened to be a party being investigated for possibly assisting a scheme to illegally export research materials back to China. This is the same CSSA that has an active connection to the Chinese Embassy. This article is not raising any new allegations against Ms. Zheng or UF’s CSSA, but is merely bringing up ones that have already been levied.
Funnily enough, UF’s CSSA protested SB 846, a bill signed into law, a year prior to the article, a bill which banned Chinese international students from working in medical labs without special permission. Again, we are not levying any accusations, just creating a timeline of events to better contextualize the activity of the CSSA.
Foreign Influence in the Sunshine
Foreign influence is taken seriously in the state. With laws banning Chinese nationals from buying up large swaths of land, barring them from lab access, and preventing state schools from contracting with foreign countries of concern, keeping education free from said entanglements should be a top priority as well. Therefore, we argue that CSSAs should be banned from all SUS schools indefinitely. Organizations operating on campus with backing from Chinese Consulates and Embassies pose a significant threat, especially when these Chinese state bodies request these organizations to carry out actions, such as monitoring Chinese students or suppressing dissent.2425 It is in the best interest for every Floridian, and also for the spirit of intellectual freedom, that these organizations are purged from universities, for behaving in ways that stifle open discussion and promote the interests of a foreign power in an unregulated fashion. We don’t have to tolerate this.
We join the pleas26 of John Moolenaar, Chairman of the House Select Committee on the CCP; Brian Mast, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; and Tim Walberg, Chairman of the House Committee on Education and Workforce to reclassify CSSAs as foreign missions, so that we can adequately investigate, monitor and shut down every CSSA that acts in a hostile nature towards intellectual freedom, other students and national security.
“2026 Best National University Rankings.” U.S. News & World Report, U.S. News & World Report, 2025, www.usnews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities.
Florida Legislature. “Section 288.860, Florida Statutes: International Cultural Agreements.” The 2025 Florida Statutes, Online Sunshine, 2025, www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0200-0299/0288/Sections/0288.860.html.
This will most likely be updated in future months, as Venezuela’s President Maduro has been deposed, and the Syrian Arab Republic experienced a similar change in leadership.
Florida Board of Governors. 9.012 Foreign Influence. State University System of Florida, 8 Sept. 2023, www.flbog.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Regulation-9.012-Foreign-Influence-Regulation.pdf.
Florida Board of Governors. Foreign Countries of Concern Report Update. Presented by Emily Sikes, Vice Chancellor for Academic and Student Affairs, State University System of Florida, 18 June 2025, www.flbog.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Presentation.pdf.
U.S. Department of State. The Chinese Communist Party on Campus: Opportunities and Risks. Sept. 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/CCP-on-campus-FINAL.pdf.
Joske, Alex. The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front System. Report no. 32/2020, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2020. https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2020-06/The%20party%20speaks%20for%20you_0.pdf
The Uyghurs are a Turkic ethnic minority lying in the far west of China. Being ethnically and religiously different (Uyghurs traditionally practice Islam) from the Han ethnic majority of China, they have faced suppression and attempts to genocide them. The CCP disputes these claims.
The One China policy is the policy that all areas considered China by the CCP should be subservient to the CCP, like Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.
Luard, Tim. “China’s spies come out from the cold”. BBC News. 22 July, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4704691.stm.
Scott, Tim. “Sens. Scott, Grassley, Risch Lead Colleagues in Demanding DOJ Address CCP Influence on College Campuses.” U.S. Senator Tim Scott of South Carolina, 8 Dec. 2023, www.scott.senate.gov/media-center/press-releases/sens-scott-grassley-risch-lead-colleagues-in-demanding-doj-address-ccp-influence-on-college-campuses/.
“CSSA.us.” CSSA.us, https://cssa.us/.
“Chinese Students and Scholars Association.” Nole Central, Florida State University, https://nolecentral.dsa.fsu.edu/organization/chinesestudentsandscholarsassociation.
“FSU-CSSA.” Google Groups, Google, https://groups.google.com/g/fsu-cssa. Archived at archive.today, https://archive.ph/qnXlT.
Use the archived version if the original Google Groups page becomes unavailable.
Niu, Xufeng. “Fwd: 关于华东理工大学商学院海外人才招聘.” FSU CSSA, Google Groups, 31 Oct. 2011, https://groups.google.com/g/fsu-cssa/c/JFjE84PSwPo/m/n7OSs9lrHlYJ. Archived at archive.today, https://archive.is/bPbuO.
Use the archived version if the original Google Groups page becomes unavailable.
“驻休斯敦总领馆举办职业论坛助中国留学生就业(组图).” 搜狐新闻, 1 Aug. 2011, https://m.sohu.com/n/315087392/?_smuid=&_trans_=000021_zwbt_813&v=3.
Zhong, Peng. “FSU CSSA 改革决议.” FSU CSSA, Google Groups, 7 Apr. 2009, https://groups.google.com/g/fsu-cssa/c/hOVYhYKa894/m/1lKqSGJ8WWoJ. Archived at archive.today, https://archive.is/Pi7h0.
FSU CSSA. “新一届FSU CSSA换届选举结果公告.” FSU CSSA, Google Groups, 9 Apr. 2011, https://groups.google.com/g/fsu-cssa/c/azrDfwALEhc/m/_2LMLlRkEtYJ. Archived at https://archive.is/9vPZX.
UCF CSSA. “Overview.” CSSA@UCF, Chinese Students and Scholars Association at UCF, 31 Oct. 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20171031082039/http://cssa.ucf.edu/overview.html.
Moolenaar, John, Brian Mast, and Tim Walberg. Letter to Secretary Marco Rubio Regarding the Chinese Students and Scholars Association. 5 Mar. 2026. Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, U.S. House of Representatives, https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/moolenaar-mast-walberg-cssa-letter-to-rubio-march-5-2026.pdf.
“Chinese Students and Scholars Association.” GatorConnect, University of Florida Student Engagement, https://orgs.studentinvolvement.ufl.edu/Organization/chinese-students-and-scholars-association.
Cupelli, Matthew. “UF Bans Student from Campus for 3 Years over Illegal Plot to Ship Drugs, Toxins to China.” WUFT, 26 May 2024, https://www.wuft.org/fresh-take-florida/2024-05-26/uf-bans-student-from-campus-for-3-years-over-illegal-plot-to-ship-drugs-toxins-to-china.
Ibid.
Saul, Stephanie. “On Campuses Far From China, Still Under Beijing’s Watchful Eye”. The New York Times, 4 May 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/us/chinese-students-western-campuses-china-influence.html.
Rotella, Sebastian. “Even on U.S. Campuses, China Cracks Down on Students Who Speak Out”. ProPublica, 30 Nov. 2021, https://www.propublica.org/article/even-on-us-campuses-china-cracks-down-on-students-who-speak-out.
Moolenaar, John, Brian Mast, and Tim Walberg. Letter to the Honorable Marco Rubio. 5 Mar. 2026. Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, U.S. House of Representatives, https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/moolenaar-mast-walberg-cssa-letter-to-rubio-march-5-2026.pdf.